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Abstract
Taking as the starting point, Majid Daneshgar’s Studying the Qurʾan in the Muslim 
Academy, I argue that the political and intellectual contexts for the study of Islam and 
indeed the Qur’an cannot be ignored whether the study is conducted in the “Western” 
or the “Muslim” academy. The construction of the categories of religion and scripture 
arise out of practices of colonialist knowledge; positionality of the author cannot be 
eliminated from the interrogative gaze. Beginning with that critique, I suggest some 
possible ways in which we can decolonize the study of the Muslim scripture and its 
experience for Muslims.
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Man is not merely a possibility of recapture or of negation. If it is true 
that consciousness is a process of transcendence, we have to see too that 
this transcendence is haunted by the problems of love and understand-
ing. Man is a yes that vibrates to cosmic harmonies. Uprooted, pursued, 
baffled, doomed to watch the dissolution of the truths that he has worked 
out for himself one after another, he has to give up projecting onto the 
world an antinomy that coexists with him.
The black is a black man; that is, as the result of a series of aberra-
tions of affect, he is rooted at the core of a universe from which he must 
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be extricated. The problem is important. I propose nothing short of the 
liberation of the man of color from himself. We shall go very slowly, for 
there are two camps: the white and the black.
Stubbornly we shall investigate both metaphysics and we shall find 
that they are often quite fluid.
We shall have no mercy for the former governors, the former mission-
aries. To us, the man who adores the Negro is as “sick” as the man who 
abominates him.
Conversely, the black man who wants to turn his race white is as miser-
able as he who preaches hatred for the whites.
Fanon 2008: 2
∵
First published almost three decades before Edward Said’s Orientalism, Black 
Skin, White Masks articulated the psychology of the colonial gaze in its epis-
temic mastery of the non-West and the construction of the “black” including 
his culture and his very being. What was needed was not merely to reverse the 
gaze and the process, for the non-West to make, subjugate, and enforce the 
inferiority of the West, but rather to affect a process of realizing the human-
ity of the colonized self in harmony with her world. Fanon’s metaphysical 
concern was in the direction not just of a postcolonial critique but a desire 
for decolonization—not a negation of self and other but a desire to rethink 
authentically one’s self and one’s metaphysics. That rethinking would take 
place within the ultimate recognition that it is not merely the human subject 
as object of the gaze that is hostage to historical contingency but rather the 
gaze itself; what is, therefore, positionality but an explicit placing of one’s his-
torical contingency at the heart of one’s experiential inquiry? (Bhabha 1994: 
340-41). Said merely took the epistemic critique further in the direction of 
reversing the colonial gaze and pointing out the processes by which the Orient 
was essentialized, dominated, restructured and controlled (Said 1978: 3). This 
is not the place to discuss the critiques of Said—Majid Daneshgar comes to 
that so we will consider it—but suffice it to say, concurrent with Wael Hallaq’s 
recent restatement, that Orientalism as a polemic went too far in allegedly dis-
missing the entire corpus of Western knowledge about the Orient as complicit 
in a relationship of power, coercion and control (applying the same mono-
lithic essentialization of the West as had been practiced for the Orient), but at 
the same time did not go far enough since it failed to critique its own secular 
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liberal assumptions (Hallaq 2018: 17-21). The Qurʾan as an integral part of that 
Orient was thus not a bearer of meaning for Muslims, nor was what Muslims 
thought about the Qurʾan of any relevance, nor was it a multi-faceted real-
ity that informed and punctuated the lives of Muslims; it was merely a site 
of domination to be redefined and controlled in order to effect a control of 
Muslims (Said 1978: 60-63).
A constructive project needs to go beyond the temptation to reverse the 
gaze to ‘shame’ the occident (see Dabashi 2020). The postcolonial struggle—or 
even the actual and imagined spaces of the postcolony—should afford us the 
possibility of thinking beyond earlier binaries, not least because it is defined 
less by a historical epoch and geographical location and more but a state of 
mind or attitude. Yet the postcolony as the contemporary location writ large 
squeezes the possibility of (seemingly) rational discourse about subjects and 
objects; in a culture of assumed constructivisms of self and other, of tradi-
tion, text, and inquiry, we have to be seen to be rational in order to appear 
human (Mbembe 2001: 1-3).1 The question is whose rationality is taken as axi-
omatic and whether that mode of reasoning, of critique, of ‘history’ are uni-
versally binding categories that define us, in Aristotelian terms, as human. 
Historical-critical (“Western,” “rational,” “academic”) studies on the text of the 
Qurʾan—its redaction and canonization—tended to dismiss what was deemed 
the traditional ‘fix’ of the emergence of the text and its “consistency” in inter-
nalist Muslim accounts of their religion and the canonization of the text; to 
put it rather starkly, the naïve native could not be trusted when it came to 
accounting for the historical formation of the tradition, or the linguistic frame-
works needed to decipher it, or even the hermeneutical skill required to make 
sense of scripture. Thomas Macaulay’s famous dismissal of oriental learning is 
rather indicative of that colonial practice. Correct philology—indeed etymol-
ogy of the Arabic language—is far too important to be left to the Arabs (Saleh 
2005). On the other hand, some Muslim traditionalists (“believers,” “holders of 
truth”) would have held that, at least post-Orientalism, or one might even say 
after the fact of the checkered history of the demonization and caricaturiza-
tion of the Islamic tradition from the medieval period onwards, ‘Western’ non-
Muslims cannot be trusted with the study of the Qurʾan, in which their claim 
to ‘critical method’ masks their hostile intent to deny and undermine ‘truth’. 
1 The postcolony is thus the default state of humans and not the exception, just as Giorgio 
Agamben has reminded us that the state of exception in which the sovereign defines the 
exception and implements a sets of policies determining the ethical and political import 
of persons as bare life and not citizens with rights and checks upon the sovereign, and that 
the concentration camp as the space for biopolitics is not the exception but the norm—see 
Agamben 1999 and 2005.
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The locus classicus of that Muslim rejection of Orientalist Qurʾanic studies is 
Parveez Manzoor’s famous and oft-quoted passage:
The Orientalist enterprise of Qurʾanic studies, whatever its other merits 
and services, was a project born of spite, bred in frustration and nour-
ished by vengeance: the spite of the powerful for the powerless, the frus-
tration of the “rational” towards the “superstitious” and the vengeance of 
the “orthodox” against the “non-conformist.”
Manzoor 1987: 39, cited in Rippin 2012: 3
Joseph Lumbard’s unpublished paper on the decolonization of Qurʾanic 
studies extends the critique to undermine Andrew Rippin’s suggestion that 
the divide between the critical and the gullible needs to be bridged through 
engagement with modern Muslim Qurʾanic studies; it is the oblivion of cen-
turies of Arabic philologies, ʿulūm al-Qurʾan, and especially Qurʾanic exege-
sis, that seems rather stark.2 Orientalist objectification and dominance of 
the non-West extends to the consideration of the intellectual heritage of the 
other as inferior. The choice between “researchers” (bāḥithūn) and orientalists 
(mustashriqūn) is not productive.
Daneshgar’s new study of the ‘Muslim academy’ seeks to go beyond that 
binary and consider how we turn the gaze away from the study by the Western 
(non-Muslim) academy to a self-critical intra-Muslim study of the academy 
with the base assumption, that he draws from the Indian-American philoso-
pher Akeel Bilgrami, that seems to valorize the academy (the Western met-
ropolitan one no less) as a neutral site for intellectual inquiry and research 
and the pursuit of truth and pedagogy in search of further research (Bilgrami 
2014: 76, cited in Daneshgar 2020: xxii). This is somewhat startling because the 
view from nowhere is a hollow—and unrealizable—claim no least because 
it evinces a denial of the ethical and the political, the affective as well as the 
embodied (Gandhi 2006: 178-79). Concepts like religion are not free-standing 
mind-independent essences but rather elements of the cognitive states of per-
sons bearing intentionality. Despite framing his inquiry within his own posi-
tionality coming from an Iranian Shiʿi background and having studied partly in 
the seminary and asking the methodological question of one’s belonging and 
stake in inquiry, Daneshgar does not have much sympathy for post-Orientalist 
and postcolonial critiques of Qurʾanic Studies. After a critical appraisal of ele-
ments of his arguments, I will contend that what the academic study of the 
2 See https://www.academia.edu/29844072/Decolonializing_Quranic_Studies accessed 
19 April 2020.
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Qurʾan needs is a double movement of decolonization; a postcolonial critique 
of the epistemology of academic Qurʾanic studies (which follows from critiqu-
ing the category of religion as universalized from the European case) does not 
go far enough. In what follows I will begin with the postcolonial critique of 
the study of religion and especially Islam and the Qurʾan—since the precise 
merit of Daneshgar’s work is to force us to think about position and method—
followed by a critique of his argument, and conclude with some suggestions 
for what a decolonized study of the Qurʾan and its ontological and social sta-
tuses may allow.
Daneshgar acknowledges but does not engage with the postcolonial cri-
tique of religion and of Orientalist Islamic studies. The methodological study 
of religion is somewhat caught in a bind. The possibility of the meaningful 
use of the category of religion, of scripture, or ritual requires us to find elastic 
but precise definitions of these terms that apply across cases. But it is still the 
case that the practice involves the universalization of a notion of religion that 
is determined and constructed in a particular European historical genealogy 
since the Reformation and especially since the Enlightenment: religion is a pri-
vate set of beliefs and cognitive states to which one assents, and scripture is to 
considered an expression of a private conversation with the beyond—but in 
both cases elements of tradition and the past which we have foregone in our 
quest for modernity and the assumption of progress (Asad 1993, Allen 2017). 
The Enlightenment project of religion suggests the triad of notions: subjec-
tivity of the religious person and his individuality over the communal (and 
the transcendent), moral agency that is negotiated and immediate and no lon-
ger absolute, and religion purely within the bounds of “reason” begging the 
question of whose rationality. Both religion and its opposite—secularity—are 
mutually constructed features of the modern world (Asad 2003, Taylor 2007).3 
This modern concept of religion—and indeed world religion—is thus an out-
come of European historical contingency and yet is considered a timeless, and 
universal social fact (Nongbri 2013: 154). Its particularity is universalized in the 
guise of an embrace for tolerance and pluralism (Masuzawa 2005). And further 
one wonders what is meant by religion: a metaphysics or ontology of thing or 
things? A faith or set of beliefs? An identity and affirmation of selfhood? A set 
3 There are far more radical critiques of the categories of religion, belief, ‘God’, sanctity and 
so forth in continental philosophy of religion that takes its cue not just from the post-
structuralist distrust of stable categories and neat definitions but also from the medieval 
Christian mystical traditions’ modes of apophasis. Thus theism, in theological mode, gives 
way to anatheism, God to the ‘god who may be’, and belief to some authentic feeling of 
attachment and not the analytic assent to truth claims, and in which the sacred and the 
religious need to be rethought and reconceptualized—see Kearney and Zimmermann 2016.
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of political practices? An ethics without an ontology? Or even as the exotic 
other of modernity?
One of the modern ways in which religion is controlled, especially in colo-
nialist epistemology and then in the postcolony, is through the “reign of quan-
tity,” according to which the notion of number identifies, indexes, restructures 
and controls (Appadurai 1993). The traditionalist thinker quite opposed to 
modernity and modern religion René Guénon (1886-1951) famously wrote 
about the obsession with quantity and the eschewal of quality in moder-
nity. Quantity—that is conflated with the “scientific”—concerns the descent 
away from the metaphysics of quality and of a principle that is unquantifi-
able (Guénon 2004, cited in Hallaq 2018: 143-64). The dominance of quantity 
over quality is then reflected in the obsession of much Qurʾanic studies in the 
mechanics of the text and its philology, deliberating bracketing not just the 
ontology of the text but also its meaning and forms of its textuality to which 
I will return at the end.4
The recognition of how decolonization of the study of religion begins with 
the category of religion and the secular has then been extended to a number of 
cases. Religions in the non-West were exoticized and orientalized both in the 
German and in the British imagination (King 1999, Park 2014, Gandhi 2006). 
Further, Peter van der Veer has shown how in the colonial period Islam and 
Hinduism were remade in the image of the successful and muscular impe-
rial Protestantism of the colonial overlord with the assumption about one 
God, one scripture, and one source of authority—but also that the colonial 
experience had a blowback on conceptualization in imperial Britain van der 
Veer 2001, Gottschalk 2012, Cohn 1997, Mehta 1999). This is of course not to 
argue that Islam and Hinduism were invented in the colonial epistemology 
but rather that the categories were made and refashioned in that context 
(Nicholson 2013). It is the porous nature of the imperial boundaries and the 
failure of the colonial project to separate and partition in order to avoid the 
contagion of the non-Western other (as well as the genealogical inquiry into 
it) that opens the space for a move towards a decolonial space, the place for a 
fulfilled ethics of friendship and cooperation (Gandhi 2006: 2-3, Bhabha 1994: 
91-95, 175). Nevertheless, the promise of a secular, indeed post-secular, religion 
and its rationality, the manner in which the terms are defined and controlled 
is a political act, not of democratization and opening up possibilities but of 
shutting down tradition, neglecting history (Abeysekara 2008). While postco-
loniality is either a persistence of a colonial past or a promise of freedom yet 
4 It is also worth mentioning the genetic fallacy of origins—as if we shall find the Ur-text 
whence the Qurʾan that will finally explain why Muslims have been so very mistaken.
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to come, decoloniality requires a careful genealogy of how we got here, a criti-
cal account that is not only diagnostic but can also enable us to transcend the 
colonial imprint on subjectivity and social life. There is thus an inbuilt cultural 
bias in much theoretical approach to the study of religion (not least because 
of the return of Hegel to that critical theory)—and perhaps that requires a 
further problematization of the category of “religio” and thinking through and 
with religion and not just about so that we take indigenous categories seri-
ously (Pal-Mandair 2009). It is striking just how many specialists of the study 
of religion would agree with Marx that “the criticism of religion is the premise 
of all criticism,” or rather like Bruce Lincoln that the primary function of the 
historian of religion is to debunk and critique religious metaphysics and imag-
inings of the world (but never to wonder if secularity has become the new 
master narrative that haunts the study of religion) (Marx cited in Pal-Mandair 
2009: 384). This need not to lapse into an incommensurability in which each 
religio is sui generis; but is naturalism and secular humanist recourse to the 
authority of “history” the only alternative? (Pal-Mandair 2009: 290-92, critiqu-
ing McCutcheon 2000). There is no reason to think that the Western academy’s 
conception of religion and history are axiomatic. It may be easy to assert the 
Christian roots of our notion of religion and scripture—but that acknowl-
edgement is not sufficient for decolonization; we need a “rigorous historical 
investigation that does not surreptitiously yield to the comforting belief in the 
liberating power of ‘historical consciousness’” (Masuzawa 2005: 327-28).
Where do we go with the category of religion and indeed of scripture? What 
sorts of concepts are these and how do they map onto ontology, and assume 
a particular philosophy of language? Cavell raises this critical problem of the 
elasticity of the concept and its communicability:
If words and phrases must recur (which means that they must be pro-
jected into new contexts, which means that the new contexts must tol-
erate or invite that projection); and if there are no rules or universals 
which insure appropriate projection, but only our confirmed capacity to 
speak to one another; then a new projection, though not at first obviously 
appropriate, may be made appropriate by giving relevant explanation of 
how it is to be taken, how the new context is an instance of the old con-
cept. If we are to communicate, we mustn’t leap too far; but how far is 
too far?
Cavell 1979: 192; see also Moi 2009
What would a decolonial theory of Qurʾanic studies look like? At one 
level it would need to take as given not just the older debate about 
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Orientalism—morphing into Islamophobia—in which Islam is taken as a 
monolithic give, an essence discernable in text and exemplified in a scriptural 
legal tradition (Ahmed 2015). Let us turn to Daneshgar’s argument and con-
sider its methodological proposal. It is a study in the politics of the Muslim 
academy and its apologetics that, while accepting the politics of the Western 
academic method in passing, seems to advocate a joined up study of Islam and 
the Qurʾan that brings together the ‘best of the academic method’ married with 
the ‘best Eastern philology’ towards a position of study that maintains a “criti-
cal but respectful approach to the Qurʾan”: the best way forward is a diversity of 
Muslim and non-Muslim approaches, and the special appeal here is to Muslims 
to open up. There is much to unpack just here—but it is further authenticated 
by an affirmation of his own positionality as an Iranian Shiʿi brought up in 
the tradition and who studied in the Muslim academy, a position that threat-
ens to slide into the sort of pleading for specialist insider (“native”) informa-
tion that Said’s Orientalism is often accused of privileging. At one level this is 
a rather depressing study: the Muslim academy (by which he says he does not 
mean the seminaries but studies in universities and other state-funded institu-
tions) is defined by apologetics that is designed to defend and shield believers 
from criticism of their faith and by a complete sectarianization and skewing of 
vision that denies a voice to any other perspective (whether internal to Islam 
or external), while the political correctness of the postmodern metropolitan 
academy increasingly self-censors in order to avoid critiques of orientalism 
and prejudice. The Muslim academy willfully censors in a paternalist desire to 
protect the “weak,” and the Western academy does so to protect itself from the 
attack of the “epistemologically” weak. “The study of Islam is more political 
than generally represented.” Nevertheless, the truth is out there—and the goal 
of inquiry—if only we would pursue it. Along the way he criticizes postcolo-
nial and postmodern perspectives not least those coming from anthropology 
and sociology: the appeal to community experience of Muslims, for Daneshgar, 
cannot explain critical elements of the text and the tradition that seem to bear 
an independent ontological status. Two consistent examples are presented of 
Islamic apologetics with respect to the Qurʾan. The first is the contrasting way 
in which the story of Zayd bin Ḥāritha is considered by Western and Muslim 
academics, the former try to get to the truth and ask why the story is presented 
in that way and how the doctrine of the “seal of prophecy” comes about (exem-
plified in the two works by David Powers), and the latter deny any questions to 
avoid any criticism of either the inerrancy of the revelation or of the Prophet. 
The second is the study of science of the Qurʾan which is broadly ignored in the 
Western academy (except perhaps among those interested in modern Muslim 
theologies) while heavily engaged in the Muslim academy as an element of the 
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exposition of the miraculous nature of the revelation. What sort of realistic 
dialogue is even possible in such a stark cultural dissonance? Acknowledging 
that Western studies are “Eurocentric,” Islamic apologetics is further exem-
plified in the translations and use of Said to demonize the Western academy, 
ignoring critiques of Said. Islamic apologetics is therefore complicit in what 
Sadeq al-Azm famously called “orientalism in reverse” (al-Azm 1981; see also 
Devji and Kazmi 2017). Daneshgar then invokes Lumbard as arguing for a dis-
missal of Western Qurʾanic studies because of its colonialist epistemologies. 
But that is not Lumbard’s claim—and not what decolonization involves. It is 
too easy to conflate decolonization (and postcolonialism) as an extension of 
the most uncharitable reading of Orientalism, just as it would be incorrect to 
dismiss the entirety of academic Qurʾanic studies in the West as hostile based 
on one’s reception of Ibn Warraq, the Inara group, and others.
Ultimately one is left with either a sympathetic or unsympathetic reading of 
Daneshgar’s diagnosis of the Muslim academy. The latter reading would entail 
considering the Western academy to be critical, discerning, and in pursuit 
of the truth because of its adherence to the value of ‘history’, and to dismiss 
the Muslim academy as overly politicized, not concerned with the truth but 
merely with a defense of “tradition,” and uncommitted to history because the 
faith transcends history. Any talk of a dialogue seems therefore hollow and 
in effect, a call for Muslim academics to reject their traditions and adopt the 
“Western method.” A more sympathetic reading is that since there are plenty 
of studies of politics, orientalism and cultural bias in the Western academy and 
no “taboo-breaking” studies of the politics of the Muslim academy, it is entirely 
reasonable for Daneshgar to focus on the Muslim context—and warn about 
the “universalization of Islamic apologetics” The possibility of the universal-
ization of Western apologetics is not really countenanced.
A decolonizing practice of Qurʾanic studies is needed not because Islamic 
apologetics need to be universalized and the West “shamed” into allowing the 
subaltern religious person to be human and to speak, but rather in order to 
save the academic enterprise from descending into a set of apologetics for 
colonialist epistemological projects. Decolonization is not about replacing one 
hegemonic discourse with another but about opening up, disrupting, dislocat-
ing the specter of the West’s globalizing model, the rhetoric of modernity (and 
rationality), and the logic of coloniality. It needs to move us from the embrace 
of the universal to the pluriversal and the interversal which does not exclude 
the Western (Mignolo and Walsh 2018: 2-3). One might object that decoloniza-
tion is not just a disruption in the academy if it fails to deal with the actual 
politics of alterity and subjugation through racism, sexism and the dominance 
of natures. So actual politics count and not merely academic politics. But 
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the violence of the discourse, of structures of thought and categorization, of 
institutions and their habitus and rules, is precisely the objective social fact 
of coloniality and Western modernity. Another objection might be whether 
one ought to consider coloniality and the imperial project of separate to be 
uniquely Western: what about Islamic imperial practices of alterity and sub-
jugation that are reflected in the disciplines of learned culture including the 
ʿulūm al-Qurʾān? That is exactly where decolonization needs to make a double 
movement against the Western academic study as well as totalizing Muslim 
imperial projects—that is not just a call for sectarianization (whose threat is 
well noted by Daneshgar) but again a move to plurality, not in the safe space of 
tolerating the other by practices of controlling inclusion. Islamic intellectual 
history cannot merely follow one hegemonic path to the exclusion of others; it 
needs to interrogate the triad of modernity, progress, and rationality (the latter 
in particular affects the study of exegesis and philosophical hermeneutics thus 
exoticizing and hereticating ‘Sufi’ commentaries and the esoteric and placing 
them beyond the canon in both Western and imperial Muslim accounts for 
the field).
So how do we move forward? The first step is to consider a critique of the 
habitation of modernity in which the academic study dwells and effect a pro-
vincialization of the European gaze, not just through the use of elements of 
European thought (one thinks of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Marxism as well as 
Heidegger) but also consider the possibility of forging a “theoretical frame-
work” for the study of religion that comes from the non-West—how about a 
theory of studying the Qurʾan that actually comes from the likes of Ibn ʿArabī 
and Mullā Ṣadrā, or even “non-canonical” figures such as Ashraf ʿAlī Thānvī 
or Sayyid ʿAlī Naqī Naqvī? (see Chakrabarty 2000 and 2002). But more so that 
that—a theory of studying the Buddhist sutras, the Dao te ching, and even the 
Bible based on the hermeneutics of Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIrāqī? This is not in order to 
dominate and locate within an inclusivist framework of inquiry but rather to 
open up the possibilities of metaphysics and of human inquiry cognizant of 
the positionality of the agent.
Second, we might want to consider the multivalency of the Qurʾan itself. 
It is not just that much of the tradition of academic Qurʾanic studies rejects 
the utility of exegesis or rather sees it merely as an exercise in self-revelation 
and expression of the training of the exegete (the ultimate eisegesis). One has 
to consider whether the text speaking directly to the self and as a series of 
symbols bearing meanings that need to be deciphered in the inscribed text 
may betray a Protestant, colonial epistemology of scripture. Here I propose 
one way in which exegesis needs to be rethought in the light of the four levels 
through which the Qurʾan may be encountered and lived—and this is about 
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awareness of those levels and not the requirement for the gaze to be Muslim. 
The first level is through the Qurʾan as a textual artefact, a book, a scripture, an 
object of veneration or recitation and contemplation, a collection of inscribed 
words that have a structure, syntactical arrangement, and strings of meanings 
as expressed in narrations that stress the importance of a venerable treatment 
of the artefact and reading the scripture in a book (muṣḥaf ) (al-Kulaynī 1981, 
hadith no. 3519, k. faḍl al-Qurʾān Ch. VII, no. 1, IV: 626). We normally under-
stand exegesis at this level as a learned, scholastic discourse intended to reveal 
layers of meaning, from the lexical to the narratological to the experiential 
(Fischer and Abedi 1990: 95-102; MacAuliffe et al. 2002; Bauer 2013; Hamza and 
Rizvi 2008). The process of exegesis, of the dialectics of engaging with the text 
and the many intellectual contexts that constitute the “semiosphere” of it, a 
field in which sign processes operate within a context, is an expression of the 
art of living, the cultivation of values, the dissemination of correct comport-
ment (adab), and the civilizing mission (Lotman 1990: 123-27, cited in Ahmed 
2015: 359-60; see also Nehamas 1998, Elias 1994, and Metcalf 1984 on civilizing 
comportment and forms of life). But this level of encountering the Qurʾan can 
include the role that the artefact plays as a talisman, as a purveyor of spiritual 
power, as a source of augury (istikhāra) and geomancy (raml), a magical book 
by which one protects, casts aspersions upon another, and heals (Loeffler 1988: 
274-86, and works like Nāṣirī 2004). The plenitude of meaning, which, as we 
saw above, embraces the exoteric and esoteric and much beyond, and the poly-
valence of the text should not require much further argument.
The second level is through the Qurʾan as a signifier within the intertextual 
weaving and production of cultural, intellectual and aesthetic capital that 
we all experience and consume. Exegesis at this level articulates and eluci-
dates elements of the “logosphere” of the Qurʾan, the field in which the scrip-
ture is articulated, uttered and expressed linguistically. In this sense, while 
believers often stand in awe of the text, they have already experienced the 
architectonics of the Qurʾan in the very fabric of Muslim life. As the famous 
saying goes, God is beautiful and loves beauty, and the very expression of the 
Qurʾan in its different articulations and presentations follows that maxim in 
which the contingencies of aesthetic harmony and form act as homologies 
for the Divine (Gonzalez 2001: 26-41, Elias 2012). Discerning and perceiving 
the beauty of the Qurʾan is not simply an act of textual reception but of aes-
thetic perception of life imbued with ‘Qurʾanicity’; appreciation of that art 
does require cultural literacy such that someone who is functionally illiter-
ate recognizes the calligraphic tokens, the melodies and intonation of recita-
tion, the motifs in the plastic arts, and the signatures and citations in music 
(Metcalf 2009: 93-119). The beauty of the Divine, manifest in the cosmos, is 
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remade and reshaped in the aesthetics of human craft—that mimesis of the 
Divine must contain elements of imperfection and human error in order not 
to fall into idolatry by considering the Qurʾan as either shibboleth or an idol 
Elias 2012: 147). It is here that Henry Corbin’s famous admonition about the 
distinction between an idol and icon is salutary (Corbin 1981: 358-64). The 
former entails a contraction of the Divine, a location of theophany and power 
within an object that in itself becomes the focus of veneration and does not 
allow one to see beyond, while the latter retains its role as a symbolon that 
propels the perceiver to use their imagination to go beyond the physical arte-
fact and contemplate the “theophanic form.”5 Or to use another analogy that 
Corbin draws, it is like the distinction between ‘existents’ which can act as a 
veil that ushers in phenomenal multiplicity and “being” that is the True One 
that underlines all that exists—one can marvel at the multiplicity and stop 
there, indulging in idolatry, or one can look at the underlying reality and rec-
ognize that each “existent” is an icon that reveals Being. It is also encoun-
tering the Qurʾan in an indexical manner in the way in which much Islamic 
literature bears the hallmarks of Qurʾanicity, by merely citing, acknowledg-
ing or referencing the scripture without deriving or marking out its mean-
ing in the production of a new text. This attraction to what is familiar is that 
same inclination that inspires love for the original signifier, both the Qurʾan 
and its revelator, by evoking the human faculties of the external senses as 
well as the internal senses of the intellect, insight and intuition, and divine 
inspiration and illumination in the heart (al-Ghazālī 1975, II: 572-73, cited in 
Elias 2012, 164-65).
The third level is through the Qurʾan as a primordial, timeless reality reveal-
ing the nature of the cosmos, the light and the guide that requires rehearsal 
and teaching among people, and as a mediating reality (al-Kulaynī 1981, 
hadith no. 3519, k. faḍl al-Qurʾān, IV:  596-606). Exegesis of this kind is the 
“archosphere” of the Qurʾan, the field that pursues the origins and the prin-
ciple whence the scripture came. This is partly what the tradition under-
stands by the teaching or revelation in its first instance, in which it exists on 
the heavenly, pre-eternal “Preserved tablet” (al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ), as well as 
by the pre-eternal “Muḥammadan light” (al-nūr al-muḥammadī) in the form 
of the person of the Prophet (and the imams, according to Shiʿi traditions) 
who was the first beloved made to stand apart from the first Lover (Heiler 
5 It is, perhaps, the Qurʾan as idol, as authority in itself to which one unreflectively genuflects 
that was best exemplified in the topos of ‘raising the text on lances’ at the Battle of Ṣiffīn in 
37/657. In this role as idol, the Qurʾan challenged the authority and person of the imam, the 
living Qurʾan; see Fischer and Abedi 1990: 106, and Amir-Moezzi 2011.
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1961: 351-52, Rubin 1975, Schimmel 1985). Allied to this notion, albeit in a 
more historically contingent sense, is Shahab Ahmed’s notion of the ‘pre-text’ 
(Ahmed 2015: 346ff).
The fourth level is through the Qurʾan as a recitation (qirāʾa, tartīl) and can-
tillation (tajwīd), the power of the uttered word of God, doubled in its potency 
when articulated on the tongue of the imam (al-Kulaynī 1981, hadith no. 3524, 
k. faḍl al-Qurʾān, IV: 614-19). Exegesis of this kind concerns the “phonosphere” 
of the Qur’an, the aural field in which the scripture is encountered. Recitation 
becomes a means not only of internalizing the text and the Divine, of meeting 
the imam, but also of aesthetic embellishment and achieving healing and ther-
apy of the self and one’s immediate context within conventional modes and 
registers (Nelson 2001, Ware 2014, esp. 62-67). Alongside the rational exhorta-
tion to those listening, the poetic register evinces similar stylistic responses 
in the reciter and in the listener (Kresse 2007: 107-8, Fischer and Abedi 1990: 
107-11). Evoking imagery (takhyīl) and provoking poetical argumentation and 
rhetoric is central to the notion of what is beautiful in the language of revela-
tion (Kermani 2015: 133-84, van Gelder and Hammond 2009). These processes 
of cultural production from the phonosphere remained efficaciously imagi-
nary whether the articulation was in the Arabic or in some vernacular (see 
Zadeh 2012).
Finally, decolonization does not mean a theologization of the problem of 
the study of the Qurʾan but still a recognition that theology does matter. It 
attempts to strike a path at an integrated and reparative study that acknowl-
edges and tries to overcome the restriction of politics, asking the critical ques-
tion of authenticity and whose authority underlies the perspective, without 
reverting to a thorough relativism in which each perspective is valid. It needs 
to effect a productive and constructive program of understanding that forgoes 
the fiction of the “academic view from nowhere.” No one will deny that this is 
difficult not least because we may not have the right language for a properly 
reparative, decolonial curriculum and method for the study of Islam and the 
Qurʾan; the hope and expectation of that linguistic turn is an element of the 
soteriology of decoloniality.
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